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Abstract: Transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) interfere regularly in policymaking in 
low-  and middle-income countries  (LMICs). The  WHO  Framework Convention for 
Tobacco Control provides mechanisms and guidance for dealing with TTC interference, 
but many countries still face ‘how to’ challenges of implementation. For more than two 
decades, Thailand’s public health community has been developing a system for identifying 
and counteracting strategies TTCs use to derail, delay and undermine tobacco control 
policymaking. Consequently, Thailand has already implemented most of the FCTC 
guidelines for counteracting TTC interference. In this study, our aims are  to describe 
strategies TTCs have used in Thailand to interfere in policymaking, and to examine how 
the public health community in Thailand has counteracted TTC interference. We analyzed 
information reported by three groups with a stake in tobacco control policies: Thai tobacco 
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control advocates,  TTCs, and  international tobacco control experts. To identify TTC 
viewpoints and strategies, we also extracted information from internal tobacco industry 
documents.  We synthesized these data and identified six core strategies TTCs use to 
interfere in tobacco control policymaking: (1) doing business with ‘two faces’, (2) seeking 
to influence people in high places,  (3)  ‘buying’  advocates in grassroots organizations,  
(4) putting up a deceptive front, (5) intimidation, and (6) undermining controls on tobacco 
advertising, promotion and sponsorship. We present three case examples showing where 
TTCs have employed  multiple  interference strategies simultaneously, and showing how 
Thai tobacco control advocates have successfully counteracted  those strategies  by:  (1) 
conducting vigilant surveillance, (2) excluding tobacco companies from policymaking, (3) 
restricting tobacco company sales, (4) sustaining pressure, and (5) dedicating resources to 
the effective enforcement of  regulations.  Policy implications from  this study are that 
tobacco control advocates in LMICs may be able to develop countermeasures similar to 
those we identified in Thailand based on FCTC guidelines to limit TTC interference.  
Keywords: tobacco control; transnational tobacco companies; tobacco industry interference; 
policymaking;  Framework Convention on Tobacco Control;  Article 5.3;  World Health 
Organization; Thailand  
 
1. Introduction  
Comprehensive tobacco control can contribute to building healthy societies and to reducing chronic 
diseases [1,2]. One central dimension of comprehensive tobacco control is controlling transnational 
tobacco company (TTC) interference in policymaking through effective surveillance, regulation and 
enforcement. Not surprisingly, TTCs do not like to be observed, regulated or compelled to follow 
laws, and they have a long history of interfering with public health efforts to control their activities [3].
 
For most TTCs, interference in tobacco control is a core business strategy. In many countries and in 
many cases, TTCs have been highly effective at employing stealthy strategies and subversive—even 
illegal—tactics to undermine public health efforts. 
Over the past six years, low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) around the world have been 
mobilizing themselves to establish comprehensive tobacco control under the World Health Organization 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) [4]. One of the general obligations under 
FCTC requires that “in setting and implementing their public health policies with respect to tobacco 
control, Parties shall act to protect these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the 
tobacco industry in accordance with national law” [5]. To date, public health communities in many 
LMICs have faced difficulties preventing TTCs from interfering with public health policymaking and 
tobacco control programs. One reason is that in LMICs, TTCs have hardly ever been studied [6]. One 
recent analysis shows that tobacco industry surveillance research has been conducted in less than 10% 
of LMICs [7]. 
TTCs have been in the business of interfering with health policymaking in LMICs for about as long 
as they have been in the business of exporting their products to those countries. The global public Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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health community only recently began to recognize the scope and depth of their interference. As a 
result, in 2000, during the early period of development of the FCTC, the World Health Assembly 
(WHA) adopted a resolution to provide guidance to countries about tobacco industry interference. The 
WHA urged member states to be aware of affiliations between TTCs and their delegations, to assure 
the integrity of health policy development,  and  to inform other  member  states of TTC  efforts  to 
impede tobacco control [8]. 
When a country’s public health community has only a clouded understanding of TTCs’ strategies 
and tactics, tobacco control efforts are likely to be incomplete, misdirected and ineffective [9]. In many 
LMICs, public health communities have been engaged in a high-stakes chess match with TTCs, but 
these public health communities has been playing like a team that can only see half the board.  
Thailand’s public health community has achieved some important successes in efforts to counteract 
TTCs’ interference. For example, WHO Tobacco-Free Initiative recently recognized Thailand’s efforts in 
“creating a firewall between the policymakers for tobacco control and the state tobacco monopoly” [10]. 
In this study, we asked three questions: What strategies have TTCs attempted to use in Thailand to 
interfere with tobacco control policymaking? What approaches have tobacco control advocates in 
Thailand developed to counteract intense tobacco industry interference? What can other LMICs learn 
from successes in Thailand? 
We present a policy analysis showing  six core strategies TTCs have used to interfere with 
Thailand’s tobacco control efforts. These six TTC strategies are: (1) doing business with ‘two faces’, 
(2) seeking to influence people in high places, (3) ‘buying’ advocates in grassroots organizations,  
(4) putting up a deceptive front, (5) intimidation, and (6) undermining controls on tobacco advertising, 
promotion and sponsorship (TAPS) [11]. We describe  three examples of TTC  interference that 
Thailand’s public health community successfully counteracted. From this analysis, we identify five 
effective counter strategies that Thailand’s public health community has used over more than two 
decades to counteract TTC interference. These strategies include: (1) conducting vigilant surveillance, 
(2) excluding tobacco companies in policymaking, (3) restricting tobacco companies’ products, sales 
and use, (4) sustaining pressure on TTCs, and (5) dedicating resources to enforce regulations effectively. 
2. Background  
2.1. Brief History of Counteracting TTCs in Thailand 
In Thailand, TTCs have been busy interfering in policymaking for many years just as they have in 
other LMICs. The tobacco control arena in Thailand has been influenced for over two decades by two 
groups  of players. On one side stand  the aggressive TTCs  and their surrogates  along with the 
somewhat  docile state-owned Thailand Tobacco Monopoly (TTM). On  the other side stand the 
governmental and non-governmental  health  organizations supported by some  academics. To 
understand TTC interference and Thai public health efforts to counteract interference, it is necessary to 
understand these players and the history of their competition. 
From 1939 to  1991, the  Thailand Tobacco Monopoly (TTM) was the only legal seller of 
manufactured tobacco products in Thailand. TTM produces about 20 brands of cigarettes  and 
determines quotas for tobacco growing. In 1989, the American tobacco industry, in its first major Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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attempt to interfere with policymaking in Thailand, worked relentlessly to force the Thai government 
to open its market to American tobacco products. The industry’s trade arm, the Cigarette Exporters 
Association (CEA), filed a complaint with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) alleging that the 
Thai government unfairly restricted foreign tobacco companies from selling their products in Thailand. 
The USTR used heavy-handed tactics to negotiate with Thai representatives on behalf of the CEA, and 
ultimately pursued the CEA’s case alleging Thailand’s trade protectionism at the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A small group of Thai tobacco control activists who had been working 
at the margins of health policymaking became galvanized by this TTC interference and they started to 
form a wider tobacco control community. In 1991, GATT authorities dealt Thailand a major blow in 
their ruling that Thailand’s policy was in violation of GATT rules on free trade, despite GATT 
provisions that allowed governments to protect their public’s health. To avoid U.S. trade sanctions, 
Thailand decided to open its tobacco market to TTCs [12]. 
In 1991, Philip Morris (PM), British American Tobacco (BAT), and Japan Tobacco (JT) began 
distributing their products legally in Thailand. By 2006, PM had increased its market share of sales 
from about 0% in 1990 to 20.8%, while BAT increased to 2.0%, and JT to 0.4% [13]. TTM’s market 
share of domestic cigarette sales dropped from 99.4% in 1990 to 75.4% in 2007 [14]. 
Early on in the trade dispute, Thai tobacco control advocates began to study the American tobacco 
industry’s interference strategies and tactics by looking at what TTCs had been doing in Central and 
South America, and by learning from foreign social scientists who had become concerned about the 
growing consequences of tobacco use worldwide [15,16].  
At this early stage of efforts in Thailand to counteract TTC interference, it was far from clear how 
Thailand’s position of self-determination based on prioritizing public health over commercial interests, 
and protection of national interests, would develop into tobacco control policy. Nevertheless, public 
resentment  of TTC interference gave Thai tobacco control activists leverage to push the Thai 
government to enact legislation quickly to counteract TTC interference. The Thai government passed 
two comprehensive tobacco control laws in 1992 based on legislation developed in Canada. In 1993, 
the government enacted a “tax for health” policy that substantially and prospectively raised excise 
taxes on manufactured cigarettes to increase their cost. Within two years, Thailand’s new legislation 
regulated and controlled TTCs more strictly than TTCs had experienced anywhere else in the world. In 
internal documents, Philip Morris noted that Thailand’s requirements for ingredient disclosure in 1992 
were “the first in the world—predating…more recent regulatory developments” [17]. 
Early on, Thai tobacco control activists were successful in ensuring that the Thai government 
adopted a policy of excluding tobacco companies and their allies from tobacco control policymaking. 
However, some TTCs realized that only a few tobacco control activists understood the high-stakes 
chess match: “… you can see that no one really has an accurate picture of what is happening. Indeed, 
of all the government officials, National Assembly Members, media, and people in the know in 
Bangkok, there are only two small groups who understand the game that is being played; a small group 
of anti-smoking activists who are determined to take down the foreign manufacturers, and willing to 
take down the TTM (Thailand Tobacco Monopoly) in the process and, the very small group of foreign 
manufacturers. No one else knows, understands or cares.” [18]. 
For more than two decades, Thailand’s public health community has vigorously pursued policies to 
control tobacco use and limit the influence of TTCs (see  Table 1). Early measures to counteract Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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tobacco industry interference took place prior to 1995–98 when the Master Settlement in the U.S. 
produced millions of internal transnational tobacco industry documents that exposed the industry’s 
practices of interference [19]. In subsequent years, members of Thailand’s tobacco control community 
invested time and effort to examine tobacco industry policies, both through collaborating with tobacco 
control advisors outside of Thailand and by looking by themselves at industry documents specific to 
Thailand. Even before 2003 when researchers in the US had mapped out specific tobacco industry 
interference strategies [20], Thai tobacco control activists had already showed from documents how 
TTCs had used both legal and illegal means to manipulate tobacco-related public perceptions and 
policymaking. Thai tobacco control activists shared this information amongst themselves. Later, 
researchers conducted more thorough investigations of tobacco industry interference in tobacco 
industry documents about Thailand [21,22]. 
Table 1. Chronology of Thailand’s Efforts to Stop Transnational Tobacco Company 
Interference. 
Dates  Factors Driving Policymaking  Policies  Accomplishments 
1985–
1989 
Government recognition that 
tobacco control is a high priority 
public health issue. 
Exclusion of all tobacco industry 
representatives from 
policymaking. 
FCTC Article 5.3; broader 
understanding and advocacy 
in tobacco policymaking. 
1990 
Public health community’s 
recognition that TTCs’ interests 
compete and conflict with the public 
health mission. 
National Committee for the 
Control of Tobacco use maps of 
interests. 
FCTC Article 5; national 
coordinating mechanism. 
1992 
Recognition that TTCs cannot be 
trusted to voluntarily limit their 
interactions with government 
agencies.  
Legislation regulating TTC 
interactions with government 
agencies.  
Laws and regulations on 
tobacco products and 
protection of non-smokers. 
National framework for 
tobacco control. 
1993 
Recognition that fiscal resources are 
necessary to implement 
comprehensive tobacco control and 
reduce tobacco use. 
Tobacco tax for health.  
FCTC Article 6; demand 
reduction through taxes. 
1996 
Recognition that TTCs should 
disclose cigarette ingredients. 
Failed attempt to implement 
ingredient disclosure law, delayed 
by 5 years of negotiations with 
TTCs.  
- 
2000 
Recognition that systems 
management is important.  
Thailand Health Promotion 
Foundation.  
Improve effectiveness in 
implementation. 
2001 
Recognition that substantial human 
and financial resources are needed to 
build comprehensive tobacco 
control.  
Legislation establishing the 
Thailand Health Promotion Fund 
through a 2% tobacco and alcohol 
surcharge.  
FCTC Article 26-sustainable 
funds and advocacy. 
 
2002 
Recognition of the need to 
strengthen regulations. 
Improved smokefree policy. New 
pack warnings proposed. 
Extend existing laws. 
2003 
Recognition of the importance of 
international commitment. 
Thai government ratifies FCTC. 
Government and NGO 
commitment to FCTC.  Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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Table 1. Cont. 
Dates  Factors Driving Policymaking  Policies  Accomplishments 
2004 
Recognition that TTCs continue to 
interfere in government 
policymaking. 
Cabinet directive barring TTCs 
from making financial or material 
contributions to government 
officials, or engaging in political 
activities. 
FCTC Article 5.3; regulation 
of TTC political 
interference. 
2005 
Recognition of a need to close 
advertising loopholes. 
Point-of-sale ban fully 
implemented. 
FCTC Article 13; stronger 
enforcement. 
2008 
Recognition of the need to 
strengthen cessation efforts. 
Policy to allocate substantial 
funding for a national telephone 
quitline. 
FCTC Article 14; smoking 
cessation support. 
2009 
Recognition that cigarettes are still 
not sufficiently expensive to 
dissuade some smokers from 
smoking.  
Legislation increasing tax on 
cigarettes. 
FCTC Article 6; demand 
reduction through taxes. 
2010 
Recognition of the need to 
coordinate organizations, experts 
and researchers.  
National Strategic Plan on 
Tobacco Control. 
FCTC Articles 21 and 22, 
Articles 5.3 and 6. 
Since Thailand’s public health community began implementing tobacco control measures in 1991, 
the smoking prevalence rate for men has dropped steadily from 59.3% to 45.6% in 2009, with the 
average number of cigarettes men smoke declining from 12 sticks per day to 10. Reported female 
smoking prevalence has remained in the range of 3%, although there is a disturbing upward trend among 
younger women [23]. 
2.2. Pioneering Tobacco Control NGOs 
Action on Smoking and Health Foundation (ASH Thailand) was established in 1986, originally as 
the Thai Anti-Smoking Campaign Project, the first tobacco control NGO in Thailand. Initially, ASH 
Thailand’s efforts focused on coping with the US tobacco trade dispute, arguing for robust public 
health protection in negotiations. When Thailand received the GATT decision favoring the TTCs, ASH 
Thailand became a driving force in the legislative process that resulted in the Tobacco Products Control 
Act and the Non-Smokers’ Health Protection Act [24]. For over two decades, ASH Thailand has 
implemented community-based tobacco control projects throughout Thailand ranging from TTC 
surveillance to promoting smokefree homes. ASH Thailand works with celebrities, film stars, singers, 
song writers and athletes to popularize their  non-smoking campaign through media and social 
marketing
 [25]. ASH Thailand catalogues tobacco news and publishes a monthly magazine to inform 
the public about TTC strategies and ASH Thailand’s counter strategies. 
Thailand Health Promotion Institute (THPI) was established in 1995 as a watchdog NGO under the 
National Health Foundation. THPI monitors TTC compliance with the law and they inform authorities 
about violations
 [24]. THPI regularly conducts studies on tobacco control policy and they disseminate 
information to the public, notably through booklets documenting unethical TTC strategies  and  
tactics [26]. For example, they alerted government officials about the hazards of a proposal favored by Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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TTCs to privatize TTM. THPI also conducts media advocacy through press releases, letters to the 
editor, and opinion editorials. In undertaking action, THPI has organized many projects including a 
youth rally against a PM-sponsored ASEAN Arts Exhibition, and a protest  against  BAT’s Canal 
Clean-up Project.  
2.3. The Thai Health Promotion Foundation (ThaiHealth) 
ThaiHealth was established in 2001 as a result of over six years of planning and advocacy by 
tobacco control activists and policymakers. ThaiHealth is an outgrowth of Thailand’s early emphasis 
on policies to reduce tobacco use and to  restrict the influence of TTCs. Legislation established 
ThaiHealth’s mandate and funding through a special surcharge of 2% of excise taxes charged to 
tobacco and alcohol producers and importers. This revenue, now about US$100 million per year, funds 
a wide range of health promotion projects, with tobacco control projects receiving about 10% of funds. 
ThaiHealth plays a significant role in restricting TTC interference because all grantees and partner 
organizations must pledge not to accept funding from TTCs or their agents. For example, over the past 
ten years ThaiHealth has increased its sponsorship of sports activities, now with over 200 partners. 
This policy has effectively shut out TTC sponsorship in venues where they once projected their image 
and promoted their products freely [27]. 
3. Methods  
We conducted this  policy  study  by examining data from three groups with a stake  in tobacco 
control policymaking:  (1) tobacco control advocates in Thailand,  (2)  TTCs, and (3) international 
tobacco control experts. We gathered information from tobacco control advocates in Thailand in the 
forms of historical materials (published and unpublished) that the advocates had collected for more 
than 20 years. We also used secondary reports on the historical development of tobacco control in 
Thailand. We analyzed documentation of case studies and interviews from assessments of the Thai 
Health Promotion Foundation in 2006 and from a WHO assessment of national tobacco control policy 
conducted in 2009 [27–29]. We obtained information from tobacco control experts and advisors from 
published research and past private communication with advisors. 
We formulated our analysis of the TTCs’ views about tobacco control in Thailand based on our 
review of over 300 internal tobacco industry documents that dealt directly with TTC policies. We 
accessed tobacco industry documents from two online databases (the  Legacy Tobacco Documents 
Library collection and tobaccodocuments.org). We examined these documents from the period 2002 to 
2011  and searched the databases using keywords including “Thailand”,  “Asia”,  “scientists”, 
“parliament member”,  “public health”,  “environmental tobacco smoke”,  and  “regulatory affairs.” 
Initially, we  searched  document sources in 2002–2003. Most of these documents have been re-
accessed so that current, updated indexing is now cited. We conducted periodic searches in the Legacy 
collection for subsequent years as new documents were added to the database. Once we located key 
phrases, persons and institutions, we performed in depth searches  following those leads.  This 
procedure resulted in a review of over 3,000 documents from at least 100 individual searches and over 
500 pages of printed findings. We obtained interview data in Thailand from interviews we conducted Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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and from findings  we reviewed from  interviews conducted by tobacco control organizations. 
Additionally, we analyzed publically available TTC documents (e.g., annual reports) and websites [30].  
For our analysis, we sought to identify general interference strategies and tactics the TTCs employ 
over a sustained period. We also sought to identify specific examples of single interference actions 
TTCs undertook that Thailand’s public health community was able to counteract. We examine how the 
public health community has pursed regulatory initiatives such as the passage of tobacco control and 
health promotion legislation,  and  impeded  TTCs  from  achieving the privatization of  TTM or the 
dismantling  of  ThaiHealth.  We look at the  importance  of  passing  strong legislation, achieving 
implementation and ensuring enforcement when resources can be marshaled, whether to build on an 
accomplishment or after a setback. We also look at how efforts to pass laws and implement regulations 
can be delayed by TTC interference. By identifying TTCs’ general strategies and tactics and studying 
cases where Thailand’s public health community has limited TTC actions, we developed an analysis 
showing how the public health community has counteracted TTC interference effectively in line with 
Article 5.3 of FCTC [30]. We look at why it is possible to achieve incremental change to prevent TTC 
interference. Finally, we examine how tobacco control advocates worked from a position of strength to 
transform their individual power of agency into structural power. 
4. Findings 
Our analysis shows that in Thailand TTCs have employed six major strategies of interference in 
health policymaking and tobacco control efforts. We found that TTCs often overlap these strategies to 
form a complex web of subterfuge. We describe these six strategies below. We also present three 
examples of TTC interference actions, and we describe how Thailand’s public health community has 
counteracted such strategies.  
4.1. TTC Strategies 
4.1.1. Doing Business with ‘Two Faces’ 
In Thailand, as in many countries, most TTCs pursue their business interests through interference in 
the political arena. Evidence shows that in Thailand some TTCs do business with ‘two faces’ to fit 
political and legal circumstances. TTC officials present one face to the public and another face to one 
another. Often, they say one thing while simultaneously doing the opposite. For example, tobacco 
industry documents show that TTCs operated in Thailand knowing that they would have to appear to 
be obeying Thai law prohibiting them from participating in the development of tobacco control 
legislation. In these documents, they stated that they had influenced the political process through 
means that were “difficult” and “non-public”, euphemisms for saying that they had conducted illegal 
hidden lobbying [31]. Another example of the TTC strategy of being two-faced is when the Thai 
government proposed restrictions on advertising and promotion of TTC products. TTCs wrote a public 
letter stating their objection claiming that the new law would eliminate their ability to advertise. Yet, 
when the law was passed, they largely ignored the restrictions and continued advertising and 
promoting their products as usual, especially at the retail level where they were rapidly expanding their 
distribution and promotion efforts [32]. The public health community has fought many such battles Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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where TTCs have made public claims about the harm they will suffer contrary to their actual actions, 
including  illegally handing out  promotional items, selling  clothing with tobacco product logos, 
installing vending machines that are banned, and distributing window displays of cartons of cigarettes. 
Policies that set standards against TTC sponsorship of sports in Thailand were valuable in designating 
areas off limits to TTC promotions. Even when TTCs said they would comply with these restrictions, 
they used TV broadcasts from outside Thailand for sports sponsorship, a loophole in the legislation. 
TTCs also shift their public face on issues in whatever direction they feel will gain them the most 
favorable press while advancing strategies they hide from the public. Our research of the industry 
documents shows that in Thailand TTCs had taken serial conflicting public positions about their 
products, namely, that the health dangers of smoking are not clear; everyone knows the health dangers 
of smoking; tobacco is not addictive; tobacco is addictive but addiction is not important; smuggling 
tobacco products is their legitimate right to provide their quality product to the public; they do not 
condone or foster smuggling and regularly help governments to stop it [33,34]. 
Increasingly, as the Thai public and government demand that corporations behave according to 
higher ethical standards, TTCs have adopted policies and practices that they say are evidence of their 
sense of corporate social responsibility (CSR). For example, PM has stated, “Today, the Philip Morris 
family of companies is one of the leading supporters of environmental protection and conservation… 
ranging from 12 countries in Central and South America to projects in…Thailand and Malaysia” [35]. 
PM  is not alone  in supporting environmental causes in Thailand.  The TTM also supports many 
environmental and educational programs in schools throughout Thailand.  TTCs present their CSR 
policies and practices as part of their public face, seeking to divert the public’s attention away from the 
detrimental effects of their products while never conceding that they have any responsibility for the 
harm their products cause [36]. The TTCs’ public face of ‘CSR’ policies and practices is contrasted by 
their private face of moral disengagement and relentless pursuit of  legal maneuvers to protect 
themselves from product liability actions or punitive  legal decisions [37]. This two-faced business 
practice is one reason that the Thai public and the business community in Thailand see TTCs as among 
the most disreputable and unethical of companies [38]. 
4.1.2. Seeking to Influence People in High Places 
TTCs have a long track record of trying to establish a positive regulatory climate for their operations. 
In Thailand, there are documented cases where TTCs have supported academics and politicians, as 
well as TTC ‘enemies lists’ of anti-smoking activists [39]. The most obvious kind of TTC interference 
is  when  TTCs  enlist influential persons to side with them in supporting or opposing an  action. 
Numerous Thai politicians have been influenced by TTCs, particularly those who have constituents 
with a stake in tobacco production in Northern Thailand. Other politicians have chosen to passively do 
the bidding of TTCs by delaying tobacco control legislation under the weight of TTC pressure or 
support.  Some TTCs have tried to influence each Minister of Public  Health and other high-level 
officials in key positions. They have attempted, sometimes successfully, to meet privately with 
Ministers of Public Health to gain their cooperation in violation of the spirit of Thai law that restricts 
TTCs from participating in policymaking. In one internal tobacco industry document, a TTC 
representative reported on meeting with the Thai Minister of Public  Health saying, “I believe the Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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present Minister offers us the opportunity to contribute our views and our success will depend on the 
degree to which we can educate him and his department on these issues, without overburdening him 
with details in which case he would probably seek clarification from our opponents” [40]. In a similar 
effort, TTCs have  hired  ‘independent’  experts and academics to persuade Thai officials that 
secondhand smoke (SHS) is not dangerous [41]. There is a long history in which academics in Asia 
have also been co-opted into accepting industry ‘expert’ opinions about secondhand smoke. TTCs 
have enlisted some Thai scientists in this effort, and through commission or omission other scientists 
have allowed themselves to be used by TCCs for their purposes [42].  
By seeking to influence people in high places, TTCs have been able to delay and in some cases 
entirely derail major tobacco control initiatives in Thailand [43]. TTCs operate under the assumption 
that many high-level government officials tend to blindly follow WHO recommendations with little 
understanding of what is at stake [44]. Thus, TTCs try to convince officials that their understanding of 
tobacco issues is superior to that of WHO staff. TTCs have been effective at persuading some Thai 
politicians and academics to take actions to undermine tobacco control. TTCs have also successfully 
enlisted some politicians and academics  to advocate openly  for TTC interests, although most 
politicians and academics shy away from blatant advocacy because they fear it will damage their 
reputation [45]. Some TTCs have been successful at simply getting officials to accept bribes, as in the 
example we describe below. All of these tactics constitute interference in policymaking. They stem 
from a pervasive view in the corporate world: Corporations do not need to be accountable to anyone 
except stockholders because the ethics of conduct for private firms are generally less demanding than 
those applied to public agencies. This is a false argument that TTCs repeatedly cite to defend their 
actions.  
4.1.3. ‘Buying’ Advocates in Grassroots Organizations 
TTCs have long tried to create a perception in the public eye that they contribute responsibly to 
society. In Thailand, they pursue this goal by transferring some of their profits to their philanthropic 
foundations and then publicizing heavily their strategic philanthropic activities. Recently, TTCs have 
given financial support to social causes that many people believe are worthwhile (e.g., 
environmentalism, human rights). In Thailand and throughout Southeast Asia, PM has emphasized its 
support of social causes and portrayed itself as a “community of caring people” [28]. In some cases, 
TTCs have funded small community projects. In other cases, they have supported highly recognized 
NGOs like the Population and Community Development Association, headed by famous AIDS activist 
Mechai Viravaidya, that is committed to reducing poverty in Thailand [46]. TTCs employ this strategy 
of ‘buying’ advocates in grassroots organizations because they can exploit groups that are desperate 
for resources. Their strategic philanthropy capitalizes on a common misconception that those who 
support good work must be good themselves. By associating themselves with worthy causes, TTCs 
attempt to create a perception that they are honest, caring organizations. Tobacco industry documents 
show that TTCs routinely strive to create such associations. TTCs claim there are no strings attached to 
the support they offer, but they hide their public relations motives from those they support and from 
the public [47]. In actuality, TTCs often expect a quid pro quo: That the groups they have supported 
will speak out on their behalf by offering testimony about their beneficial actions for society [48]. The Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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public health community in Thailand has found an effective way to counter this strategy,  beyond 
simply exposing it. ThaiHealth supports a wide range of social development projects, including ones 
that seek to improve the environment and social well-being. ThaiHealth requires, as a condition of 
support, that grantee and partner organizations that receive ThaiHealth funding not accept support 
from TTCs or their surrogates [27]. This has greatly reduced TTCs’ ability to employ this strategy.  
4.1.4. Putting up a Deceptive Front 
TTCs use  front groups  (fake  grassroots organizations) and surrogates to  interfere with 
policymaking. Some TTCs in Thailand employ this patently unethical public relations practice to 
further their corporate interests. For example, in the 1990s, Gray Robertson of  Healthy Buildings 
International (of Australia) went around Asia, sponsored by PM, to talk about ‘sick building syndrome’ 
with the undisclosed objective of trying, on behalf of PM, to dissuade officials from giving attention to 
indoor SHS exposure. Robertson was promoting himself as an “independent expert” and he was aided 
in this deception by two academics working for PM who lectured on air quality issues in Thailand and 
other Asian countries. In actuality, his purportedly ‘independent’ air quality/ventilation business was 
mostly a front for TCCs who were pursuing their objective of delaying or stopping SHS regulations. In 
Thailand, most of Robertson/PM’s work using this strategy came after the 1992 Nonsmokers’ Health 
Protection Act had already been enacted, so legislation already mandated the reduction of exposure to 
SHS. However, subsequently “independent experts” were successful in causing a delay in updating 
SHS regulations  because they convinced  Thai officials and academics to give limited attention to 
monitoring and enforcement of the ban on indoor SHS pollution [41]. 
4.1.5. Intimidation 
TTCs use intimidation not simply to exhibit their might, but often to destroy the reputation and 
career of anyone they feel threatens them. Tobacco control experts and advisors have highlighted how 
TTCs relentlessly  intimidate politicians, academics, and public and private organizations to coerce 
them into following  their  policy  agenda  at the risk  of  facing  harsh consequences [49]. Tobacco 
industry internal documents show that TTCs will make every effort to see that politicians who oppose 
them are defeated. They do this to destroy their perceived enemies and to intimidate other politicians 
[50]. In Thailand, TTCs intimidate officials by threatening to file law suits and legal challenges. Their 
strategy has been effective. For example, when members of parliament were crafting provisions of the 
Tobacco Product Control Act, TTCs used intimidation to see to it that the product disclosure provision 
was  not supported. When  the Act was eventually passed,  the product disclosure provision of the 
legislation was gutted. In another case, TTCs gained powerful international support from the EU, the 
US, and the UK to pressure the Thai government and tobacco control advocates to extract assurances 
from the Thai government that officials would not release lists of cigarette ingredients to the public, 
even though the TTCs had supplied this information to the government [22].  
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4.1.6. Undermining Controls on Tobacco Advertising, Promotion and Sponsorship (TAPS) 
TTCs oppose restrictions and bans on TAPS because they see their very existence tied to TAPS. 
For example, a PM report about public relations strategies stated: 
If one takes the pessimistic view of present trends, the tobacco industry could lose all its 
political clout within two years. Overstated? Not really. If you take away all advertising 
and sponsorship, you lose most, if not all, of your media and political allies. If you take 
away those freedoms, there is hardly any barrier to a punitive tax regime, part of it going to 
fund our complete anathematization through the funding of ever more extreme anti-
campaigns courtesy of ‘social levy’ foundations, of which there is a growing fashion [51]. 
In Thailand, where bans on TAPS were instituted nearly two decades ago, TTCs continue to 
undermine any law or regulation banning TAPS. In 1992, TTCs claimed that if the Tobacco Product 
Control Act were passed, advertising as they commonly practiced it would be prohibited. Yet after the 
Act was passed, many TTCs continued their business-as-usual promotion of their products, especially 
at the retail level. It was not until 2005 when the Thai government began enforcing the ban on tobacco 
retail displays that the TTCs began begrudgingly complying  [52].  Even today, TTCs continue to 
promote their products illegally at some sports, music and entertainment venues. Their “cigarette girls” 
still work at nightspots, and TTCs still promote their products to individuals through the Internet [53]. 
PM sponsored the ASEAN Art Awards, and later mentioned in internal documents that they were able 
to influence the ASEAN secretariat on trade issues because they had invested in this program [54]. 
Clearly,  TTCs continue to violate TAPS  laws  because they desperately need to reach new 
customers [47]. It is of equal concern that they violate these laws to try to maintain a public perception 
that their products are harmless and desirable. This insidious practice is designed to garner public 
support to legitimize their practice of interfering with policymaking.  
4.2. Case Examples 
Three examples of tobacco company interference in Thailand include: (1) a large donation a TTC 
made to the Ministry of Education, (2) a tobacco industry conference and trade show called “TabInfo 
Asia 2009” held in Bangkok, and (3) bribes a TTC paid to Thai officials responsible for purchasing 
tobacco for the Thai Tobacco Monopoly. 
4.2.1. A Donation to the Ministry of Education 
In 2003, PM made a 3,000,000 baht (about 72,000 US dollar) donation to the Ministry of Education 
(MoE) for school programs. PM publicized their philanthropic gesture widely. The donation was in 
fact an attempt to influence people in high places and an effort to promote their company image in the 
policymaking arena. The Thai public health community was effective in detecting and counteracting 
this strategy. ASH Thailand lobbied the MoE intensely until the MoE decided to return the donation to 
PM [55]. This counter action was successful because ThaiHealth has officials from many government 
ministries, including the MoE, who served on its board. Government agencies that receive grants from 
ThaiHealth are required to commit to not accepting support from TTCs.  This provision makes Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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government agencies accountable and reduces TTC attempts to co-opt individuals and institutions [26]. 
However, even though TTCs were well aware of this provision, they still brazenly attempted to make 
the donation, and the MoE initially accepted it.
 
4.2.2. TabInfo Asia 2009 
In 2009, Thai tobacco control groups learned that the tobacco industry was planning to hold a 
conference and trade show in Bangkok. The industry uses such events strategically to boost their 
image in a country or region, influence people in high places, promote their products indirectly to a 
wide audience, and show that they are an intimidating business force that can operate without the 
acceptance of the  government or NGOs. The industry expected TabInfo to draw up to 3,000 
participants. 
Several Thai governmental agencies and NGOs opposed the event and countered the industry’s 
strategies. The government declared that TabInfo was a public event, therefore making Thailand’s 
laws prohibiting tobacco advertising and product display enforceable inside TabInfo. NGOs organized 
several levels of protest. Youth demonstrated at the event site with tobacco control activists from 
neighboring countries. NGOs gained extensive local and international media coverage. At least 300 
articles appeared in Thai print news as well as radio and television coverage, made possible by strong 
contacts Thai tobacco control NGOs have developed within the mass media over many years. 
Less than 900 participants actually attended the event, making it a costly failure for the industry. 
Thai government officials did not participate in the event. TTM converted their anchor megapavilion 
from a product showcase into a “Welcome to Thailand” visitors center. Thai police arrested and fined 
trade show organizers for violating Thai laws, the first time that tobacco exhibitors had ever been held 
accountable for advertising at their own trade show. The industry’s image was decidedly tarnished. 
TTCs were unable to influence people in high places, promote their products or intimidate the Thai 
public health community. In addition, the protest brought together representatives from the Southeast 
Asia region for training and to  establish a surveillance system to control industry interference 
according to provisions of FCTC Article 5.3 guidelines [56]. 
4.2.3. Bribing Thai Officials  
In 2010, Dimon, Inc. and Standard Commercial Corporation (now merged together as Alliance 
One, one of the largest international tobacco leaf suppliers) paid more than US$1.8 million in bribes to 
Thai tobacco officials at TTM to obtain over $18.3 million in sales contracts. The US Securities and 
Exchange Commission  initially reported the bribe.  Subsequently, the Thai Department of Special 
Investigation undertook its own investigation [57]. While it is common in Thailand for businesses to 
seek to influence people in high positions, this case shows that TTCs brazenly offer politicians and 
officials big favors to achieve their ends. 
These are just three examples that illustrate TTCs’ aggressive, corrupt business practices, and their 
disregard for tobacco control policy. The examples illustrate how TTCs often employ a strategy that 
fulfills multiple goals. Importantly, the examples show so ways that tobacco control advocates have 
thus far been able to thwart TTC efforts to undermine tobacco control. Advocates have successfully Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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derailed TTC efforts to establish a joint venture with TTM, to covertly promote the privatization of 
TTM, and to attempt to orchestrate the dismantling of ThaiHealth. 
Past TTC practices offer important clues about strategies and tactics TTCs may use to interfere with 
tobacco control in the future. We now turn to a discussion of ways LMICs can prevent, detect and 
counteract TTC interference.  
5. Policy Implications  
Our analysis shows that tobacco control advocates will be wise to be highly vigilant about TTC 
activities  because TTCs employ multiple strategies in the sociocultural, commercial and political 
environments,  and they invent new subversive  approaches. It is important to be proactive about 
anticipating TTC strategies while being ready to respond swiftly to counteract their interference. While 
policymaking and legislation are essential, proactive efforts should go far beyond simply declaring 
policies and enacting laws that are consistent with the FCTC. 
A comprehensive approach is preferable because it deals with TTC efforts to interfere with tobacco 
control at multiple levels from different angles. A comprehensive approach involves being vigilant 
while simultaneously undertaking policy innovations that will prevent TTCs from circumventing or 
undermining FCTC-based policies. It is important to make every effort to exclude TTCs from the 
policymaking arena so as to prevent them from taking unacceptable actions. It is also essential to 
conduct a thorough assessment of TTC vulnerabilities to limit and ultimately stop their interference. 
About two decades ago, the Thai Government and tobacco control leaders began establishing a 
comprehensive set of countermeasures that now serve as a template for success. They include tobacco 
control legislation, ingredient disclosure, tax policy, sustainable funding for tobacco control, cigarette 
pack warnings, ban of point of sale display, and designation of smokefree public and private places. At 
the same time, the government established a “firewall” to restrict TTC involvement in tobacco control 
policy—an aggressive stance for preventing TTC interference. The government and tobacco control 
leaders continue to develop policies that restrict TTCs activities and limit their ability to implement 
new strategies. We now describe some recent innovations. 
5.1. Policy Innovations to Counteract and Prevent TTC Interference 
In Thailand, the public health community recently developed a National Strategic Plan for Tobacco 
Control for 2010–2014  (NSPTC)  under the auspices of the National Committee for the Control   
of Tobacco Use  (NCCTU). The NCCTU  was  established in 1989  to  form  tobacco  policies  and 
implementation guidelines, carry out management and coordination, monitor and follow up on tobacco 
control measures, enforce tobacco control laws, and appoint subcommittees [58]. NCCTU is chaired 
by the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH)  with representatives from professional organizations,  
health-related NGOs, related ministries and the media. 
One of the eight areas of the National Strategic Plan for Tobacco Control is surveillance and control 
of TTC interference [59]. Within this area, there are seven strategies, each with one or more activities. 
The activities follow many of the suggested measures in FCTC  Article 5.3 guidelines [3]. The 
following is a list of the most important activities underway in Thailand.  Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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1.  Increasing public awareness of regulations prohibiting TTC interference. 
2.  Monitoring public relations, government and TTM contacts with the TTCs, and TTC CSR 
activities. 
3.  Monitoring vested interest groups that work with TTCs. 
4.  Issuing notifications  of regulations prohibiting importation, manufacturing, or sale of new 
types of tobacco products. 
5.  Informing the public of marketing and other threats from TTCs. 
6.  Establishing surveillance networks of TTC activities down to the community level. 
7.  Taking legal action on new or “below the line” marketing techniques. 
8.  Researching, regulating, and campaigning against tobacco industry CSR activities. 
9.  Monitoring TTC glamorization of tobacco. 
10.  Educating the public to understand that tobacco use is a non-normative behavior. 
11.  Monitoring TTC legal violations, taking legal action, and publicizing prosecutions and penalties. 
It is important to note that in Thailand prior to 2000, existing tobacco control authorities, ASH 
Thailand, THPI and other NGOs had undertaken at least five of these actions (i.e., 1, 2, 5, 8, 9). To 
realize these goals over the next two years, a wider group of organizations and agencies have joined 
together to produce research and counteract TCC interference. 
Following the approval of the NSPTC  by the NCCTU in 2010, the MoPH formed 12 NSPTC 
implementation committees under the coordination of the Bureau of Tobacco Control (BTC) [60]. 
BTC was established in 1991 in the Department of Disease Control, MoPH (originally as the Tobacco 
Consumption Control  Office)  to regulate Thailand’s newly opened tobacco market according to 
provisions in the Tobacco Product Control Act [24]. Tobacco industry surveillance is one of BTC’s 
main activities. BTC investigates complaints about potential TTC violations of law with provincial 
public health offices and 12 regional disease control centers. Individuals can report potentially illegal 
TTC activities directly to the BTC through a call center or through the Internet. One of the BTC’s most 
important projects  is to develop and operate a National Surveillance System  that includes four 
activities: conducting law enforcement, studying tobacco consumption patterns, monitoring media, and 
increasing surveillance of TTC. The BTC has designed this system to consolidate information from 
active and passive monitoring sources, centrally and regionally, and to develop a database for tobacco 
control research [59].  
One of the 12 NSPTC implementation committees  has a mandate to monitor and control TTC 
interference in tobacco control policymaking, and to take legal actions when necessary. Membership of 
this committee consists of 23 officials representing professional institutions, health-related NGO’s, and 
academics, including from the Excise Department, Council of State, and Ministries of Commerce, 
Education, Interior, Tourism  and Sports, and Culture [59].  In addition, committees other have 
mandates that contribute to the surveillance of TTCs. 
In the NSPTC, many key activities require surveillance and monitoring of TTC activities at the 
regional, national, and local levels, and assessment of TTC vulnerabilities. These research activities 
have to be coordinated in a network and supported on a long-term basis. One important policy 
innovation has been to build a research network focused on studying TTCs and to create sustainable 
mechanisms for supporting such research. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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Thailand-based tobacco control advocates participate in a regional network called the Southeast 
Asia Tobacco Control Alliance (SEATCA), established as an NGO in 2001 to support comprehensive 
tobacco control in seven Southeast Asian countries. SEATCA brings together representatives from 
NGOs, research institutions and governments. SEATCA coordinates and supports research on TTCs to 
improve  tobacco control laws;  expand  smokefree  environments;  and restrict TAPS.  SEATCA’s 
strategies focus on: (1) building up local evidence bases; (2) enhancing local capacity building and 
mentorship; and (3) developing policy through research dissemination. SEATCA has sponsored events 
to advance FCTC guidelines on limiting TTC interference, including publishing the “Surveillance of 
Tobacco Industry Activities Toolkit” and “Tobacco Industry Interference in Health Policy in ASEAN 
Countries” [61,62]. 
Monitoring TTC activities  is often difficult and requires painstaking attention to details. To be 
effective at identifying subversive TTC interference, it is important to have ongoing credible research 
that informs  policymaking.  Since the FCTC guidelines were established, Thailand’s public health 
community has moved to comply with tobacco control best practices specified in WHO’s MPOWER 
indicators [63,64]. To this end, the Tobacco Control Research and Knowledge Management Center 
(TRC) was established in 2005 as an academic research center at Mahidol University’s Faculty of 
Public Health. Funded by ThaiHealth, TRC promotes and supports research on and surveillance of 
TTCs among other topics. TRC works to discredit and debunk misinformation the tobacco industry 
provides. 
Recently, SEATCA and TRC jointly launched the Tobacco Industry Surveillance and Study Group 
(TISSG) to advance previous efforts to analyze TTC policies and actions. One innovative approach to 
research is that TISSC-sponsored researchers, including young investigators, increasingly collaborate 
with international researchers on policy evaluation studies such as the present study [65].
 TISSC has 
established Internet-based monitoring and reporting systems to compile up-to-date  surveillance  
data [63]. Using these data, TISSC has mapped TTC interference strategies and tactics in Thailand and 
regionally [66]. 
5.2. Guidance for LMICs 
Our analysis of the history of efforts in Thailand to control TTC interference reveals an inspiring 
story of possibilities for LMICs. For the first decade of tobacco control in Thailand, a committed group 
of less than a dozen full-time tobacco control advocates managed to mobilize social support for tobacco 
control, gather evidence, make specific claims against TTCs, define the principles of engagement, and 
push unceasingly for ever stronger legislation and enforcement. Since the first confrontation at GATT, 
they have also sought the advice of international experts to learn about strategies tobacco control 
advocates have used abroad to counter TTC interference. This small group pursued their goals with a 
clear-eyed understanding that TTCs would neither  accept evidence  proving the dangers of their 
products nor act ethically if they were allowed to participate in tobacco control policymaking. This 
small group also recognized that TTCs were willing to use any means to pursue their goals, including 
using legal action, obstruction, harassment, slander, influence buying, bribery, fraud and conspiracy. 
Our analysis also shows that tobacco control advocates recognized that there were limits to the 
amount and type of influence they could have as a small group of individuals. Therefore, in the second Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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decade, they converted some of their individual power of agency into structural power by working to 
establish a tax-supported health promotion foundation. Tax-supported foundations can provide stable 
resources for tobacco control. They can also expand the community of partners engaged in exposing 
TTC interference and holding TTCs accountable. Moreover, such foundations can be a vehicle for 
integrating tobacco control into the larger national agenda for development. In Thailand, the advent of 
ThaiHealth has transformed the public health landscape; rather than a few activists working on a single 
health issue, Thailand now has a wide-range of partners with broader interests conducting tobacco 
control. 
Emerging evidence from studies in LMICs shows that TTCs cannot be trusted to behave as good 
corporate  citizens,  follow tobacco control laws or  comply with polices  [67].  FCTC provides an 
international framework for national action to keep TTCs in check and hold them accountable, but in 
many LMICs, TTCs can still manipulate political systems and circumvent or co-opt legal infrastructures. 
Thus, at a fundamental level it is important for tobacco control advocates to work to strengthen their 
political  and legal systems  as much as possible so that stronger tobacco control legislation and 
regulations can be enacted. Of course, this takes time and effort.  
In most LMICs, TTCs can pursue their interference strategies successfully because of a lack of 
enforcement of existing laws and policies. Police and other enforcement agencies are often underfunded 
and uninterested in enforcing tobacco control laws. In some cases, they also participate as a partner 
with TTCs in corruption. So, tobacco control advocates have to push relentlessly to make it impossible 
for police and other law enforcement agencies to avoid enforcing laws. In Thailand, tobacco control 
advocates have worked for many years to improve the basic legal framework so that tobacco control 
could be more effective. For example, they have made it impossible for government agencies to avoid 
enforcing the point-of-sale display ban. In the TabInfo Asia 2009 case, they pushed in public, through 
media coverage, to make it impossible for the police to avoid taking action. These successes have 
encouraged tobacco control advocates in other LMICs to work on improving their legal systems while 
pursuing aggressive enforcement actions against TTCs consistent with FCTC provisions. 
In LMICs, long-term support from political sponsors is an essential ingredient for reducing TTC 
interference.  Experience in Thailand shows that tobacco control advocates have been successful 
because they seize political opportunities as they emerge and they generate political support when it is 
necessary. Advocates have found that politicians with differing political philosophies are sometimes 
surprisingly  willing to support tobacco control legislation  that  is  based on sound principles. Such 
politicians are especially cooperative if their support offers the prospect of popular recognition and 
widespread  approval from their  constituents.  This shows that it is important to cultivate ethical 
relationships with politicians regardless of political affiliation, and to give politicians recognition for 
their support. This, however, should not require that advocates align themselves too closely with one 
politician or party, with the implied expectation of reciprocity in other political matters. 
In attempting to prevent and counteract TTC interference, it is important to “inoculate” and 
mobilize the general public against TTC actions through health promotion. In Thailand, everyone from 
high-level government officials to common citizens is involved in health promotion. One important 
focus of health promotion in Thailand is providing a steady stream of credible information about TTCs 
to the mass media. Twenty-five years of tobacco control campaigning has had a remarkable effect. A 
recent survey  shows that a large majority of smokers have a negative view of smoking, and they Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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support smokefree public places, support a complete ban on advertising, and support services to help 
smokers quit smoking [68]. 
Counteracting TTC interference depends on a wide and deep commitment at the level of 
development policy and systems change, not just on the efforts of a few NGOs or the regulatory efforts 
of a few governmental agencies. As Beaglehole, an expert on health systems change has emphasized, 
“In the long term, monitoring and accountability are necessary, but not sufficient for implementation 
of mutually synergistic interventions as shown with the slow implementation of the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control;  …  action should emphasize integration of … interventions into 
national development processes and the actions of multilateral institutions” [69]. 
Stakeholders in LMICs working to integrate tobacco control into the mandates of many agencies 
may likely face similar TTC interference strategies as those encountered in Thailand. This is because 
TTCs tend to replicate their strategies across LMICs. To provide LMICs with specific guidance about 
how to apply our findings to their own efforts to counteract TTC interference, we offer the following 
recommendations and descriptions of options. 
5.3. Recommendations and Options for Low- and Middle-Income Countries 
1.  Establish legal mechanisms to regulate and monitor TTC all interactions with all government 
agencies. Since tobacco control is a public health issue, legal mechanisms often focus on public 
health law. Codify in law restrictions on interactions with TTCs that apply to all government 
agencies and officials. Develop a proactive legal framework that anticipates TTC interference 
strategies seeking to influence people in high places. 
2.  Ensure transparency and accountability in government. Working transparently with partners 
inside and outside of government is essential to maintaining a united front for prohibiting TTC 
efforts to influence people in high places. It is important to establish specific policies limiting 
TTC interactions with government agencies through publically disseminated rules of engagement 
for all government and public-supported agencies, including the rejection of TTC-sponsored 
CSR projects. 
3.  Seek  robust, transparent policymaking to avoid TTC stalling tactics and efforts to dilute 
legislation.  Opportunities to take action against TTCs  are often time-sensitive,  so it is 
important to act quickly when favorable  political conditions for strong action are  present. 
Establish an advocacy plan and timetable that does not give  TTCs opportunities to use 
intimidation to derail strong legislation and regulation.  
4.  Establish sustainable funding for research and surveillance. It is important to identify, study 
and expose TTC interference. Sustained research and surveillance are cost effective for society. 
Earmarked taxes on all types of tobacco products equivalent to at least 75% of the retail price 
are  an effective way to support  tobacco control  research,  guarantee  resources for tobacco 
control projects, and build tools to minimize TTC political interference. 
5.  Squelch  influence buying  in  academia and civil society.  Work to gain  cooperation from 
partners to follow rules limiting interactions with TTCs to reduce their influence on important 
people, reduce their ability to buy advocates in grassroots organizations, and put up a deceptive Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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front. Establish consequences for groups and individuals who accept money or other support 
from TTCs, or who work as surrogates for TTCs. 
6.  Build public support for tobacco control.  When official enforcement  is weak, an effective 
alternative can be to engage the general public in monitoring of TTC non-compliance with laws 
and policies. Build a cadre of watchdogs in the public and constantly highlight the benefits of 
tobacco control in the media while exposing TCCs’ subversive practices in public. 
7.  Promote innovation and broad implementation through strategic partnering. Tobacco control 
measures  often  result in important  societal benefits in addition to the improvement of the 
public’s health. Tobacco control advocates should seek to identify a wide range of stakeholders 
beyond the field of tobacco control who will be willing to integrate tobacco control into their 
projects from the national level to the community level. It is important to enlist experts and 
authorities who support innovative tobacco control measures and who will champion the benefits 
of confronting TTC interference. 
8.  Denormalize tobacco use to counteract TTC image-making. Counteract TTCs by working on 
actions that reduce the overall acceptance of tobacco and diminish the credibility of TTCs. 
Work through these actions to counteract TTC attempts to undermine controls on TAPS. Such 
actions should include establishing 100%  smokefree  places,  requiring large picture pack 
warnings, and prohibiting store displays of cigarettes. Use research and advocacy to educate 
policymakers so that denormalization measures are adopted. 
9.  Upgrade laws to meet all WHO FCTC requirements and guidelines. Understand the political 
process and map out a political strategy to establish laws for implementing FCTC measures. 
Building legal support for FCTC provisions may require informing and lobbying policymakers 
over a long period of time. Work on multiple fronts to show policymakers your determination 
to move tobacco control through the  legislative  process.  Seek out political supporters 
regardless of their political affiliation.  
10.  Monitor TTC activities.  Build a coalition of marketing, economic, legal  and public health 
experts to monitor TCCs and take preemptive action against TCC interference. Identify front 
groups and individuals who are likely to be complicit in TTC practices of doing business with 
two faces  by  misrepresenting  the consequences of tobacco control measures or acting 
subversively to allow TTCs to put up a deceptive front. 
11.  Foster cooperative efforts among interested parties while excluding TTCs. TTCs often try to 
pit tobacco control advocates and organizations against each other on important policy issues. 
Building cooperation  therefore comes from  being  aware of  how  TTCs  seek to manipulate 
tobacco control partners and interested parties in policymaking. Constantly educate partners and 
interested parties by providing current examples of TTC interference, and highlight successful 
strategies for counteracting interference. 
6. Conclusions  
FCTC has raised tobacco control advocates’ awareness about how TTCs attempt, often 
successfully, to interfere in policymaking. But awareness is not enough. Even now, in an era when 
TTCs are confronted with the first international tobacco control treaty endorsed by over 170 countries, Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2012, 9                 
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they continue to subvert, delay and destroy policymaking efforts to reduce tobacco use. TTCs are 
especially aggressive in their attempts to interfere in policymaking in LMICs where the potential for 
profits is the  highest, and where political and legal structures are typically  less than robust [70].
 
Experience in Thailand shows that TTCs employ multiple strategies to ward off any restriction of their 
business activities, and they exhibit persistent ingenuity in their efforts to avoid following laws or 
complying with policies. 
The public health community in Thailand, coming together from governmental and non-governmental 
agencies, has made important gains in preventing and controlling TTC interference. Today, Thailand is 
already in compliance with many provisions of FCTC and the MPOWER indicators [71]. The gains 
have been hard won. Thailand’s compliance with FCTC is the result of more than two decades of 
sustained, dogged effort. 
Since TTCs are multinational corporations with the habit of testing and replicating their strategies 
around the world, LMICs can anticipate that TTCs may be using the same interference strategies that we 
have identified in Thailand. Experience in Thailand shows that it is possible for tobacco  control 
advocates, through careful study and persistent effort, to establish structures and systems for preventing 
and counteracting TTC interference. Just as TTCs employ strategies according to country-level and 
local conditions, so too is it necessary for national public health communities to critically assess what 
policies and measures make sense in their context. FCTC provides guideposts. However, basic 
compliance with FCTC should not be the goal. Only creative thinking, greater ingenuity and vigilance 
will take us beyond FCTC’s protocols and guidelines to the point where TTCs find it counter-productive 
to interfere with policymaking. Instituting measures to stop TTC interference is a goal worth aiming to 
achieve, just as nearly two decades ago two legal experts aimed for the goal of persuaded people 
around the world that an international treaty on tobacco control was worth achieving [72]. 
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